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Abstract: The implementation of carbon reduction policy is an important 
method for the firms to reduce carbon emissions. So it is of great significance to 
research on the firms’s trategies under different carbon reduction policies. In this 
paper, we study the manufacturer’s wholesale price strategy and the retailer’s 
ordering strategy, as well as carbon emissions policy’s impact on the production 
and profit, under mandatory carbon emissions capacity policy, carbon emissions 
tax policy and cap-and-trade policy respectively. In addition, the government’s 
decision-making about carbon emissions policy parameters is also discussed. 
The conclusion builds a microeconomic foundation for the carbon emissions 
policy’s design and development, and also verified the policy’s effectiveness and 
scientificity, at last achieved the “win-win” ofthe government and enterprises.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse effect caused by carbon dioxide emissions has become the focus of global 
attention. As the development of low-carbon economy, reducing global carbon emissions is 
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an important strategy to prevent climate from warming. Today, carbon emission has become a 
major survival and development threat to global enterprise that can not be ignored. At present, 
the world has entered a critical period of energy saving and emission reduction: The chinese 
govermment has solemnly promised to the international organization that carbon dioxide 
emissions brought by per unit of GDP will be reduced by 40%-45% in 2020 than in 2005. 
Different carbon emission policies, including mandatory carbon emissions capacity, 
carbon emissions tax and cap-and-trade have become the key factors in effecting 
manufacture’s pricing and retailer’s Ordering. In 2009, Wal-Mart proposed the “low carbon 
supermarket” in the “World Low Carbon and ecological economy Conference.” Wal-Mart 
has developed a variety of methods, such as energy saving and green products,  reducing 
waste, and improving supply chain’s efficiency.
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years, as serious global environmental problems are increasing, many scholars 
have researched on carbon emissions issues. Most of the present researches focused on the 
macroscopic level. Benjaafar, Li and Daskin (2013) study aboutlow-carbon supply chain 
under mandatory carbon emissions capacity policy, cap-and-trade and carbon offsets, the 
vendor deciding the production and when to replenish in multiple cycles. (Du, Ma, Fu, 
Zhu, & Zhang, 2011) When considering emissions trading, constructs a supplier and rely 
on non-profit organization of green environmental protection as a carbon emissions rights 
of enterprises to form a new type of supply chain, based on the newsboy model research 
on Stackberg of the game process. (Lin, Anderson, & Cruz, 2012) Production and sales of 
environmentally friendly products the important benefit from an increase in demand from 
the consumer environmental awareness, environmental protection manufacturers marketing 
methods should be taken to guide the consumer to increase environmental protection 
meaning, motivate the green consumers into a green consumer. (Vipul & Sridhar, 2000) 
Considering the risk factors, we use the newsvendor model under uncertain demand to get 
the optimal purchase quantity and price decision, in order to achieve maximum expected 
utility. Song and Leng (2012) found the firm’s optimal production and corresponding expected 
profit under different carbon emissions policies.
3.  MODEL DESCRIPTIONS AND ASSUMPTION
This paper considers a two-stage supply chain which is composed of a manufacturer and 
a retailer, manufacturer dominating. In this supply chain, we study how the manufacturer 
prices the products and how much the retailer orders goods. We assumes that the 
manufacturer is independent ofthe retailer, and their information is symmetrical, their 
risks are neutral. The cost of each product is CS, the retailer faces with a stochastic market 
demand x, and the priceis an exogenous variable. If the production Q exceeds the demand, 
the remaining products P will be sold at a price of V. On the contrary, if the demand exceeds 
the production, the manufacturer will pay Cμas “shortage cost”, P＞CS＞V＞Cμ.
Under Policy 1-mandatory carbon emissions capacity (a mandatory capacity on the 
amount of carbon emitted by each firm), the carbon quotais A, each product produces e unit 
carbon emissions, Q0means the mandatory capacity of the production that results incarbon 
emissions, Q0=A/e. Under Policy 2-carbon emissions tax (tax imposed to each firm on the 
Manufacture’s Optimal Pricing Policy and Retailer’s Optimal Ordering Policy 
Under Different Carbon Emission Policies
22
amount of carbon emissions), the carbon emissions tax foreach product is t. Under Policy 
3-cap-and-trade policy, the trading price of unit carbon emissionis i.
This paper analyzes and discusses the influence of different carbon policy on 
manufacturer’s pricing and retailer’s ordering.
4.  MODEL FORMULATIONS
4.1  Retailer’ Sorderingstrategy
The retailer faces a stochastic market demand, the quantity of order is made according to 
the wholesale price W. For the retailer, no matter which policy the government adopts, the 
ordering decision is based on the wholesale price. Without carbon policy, let the optimal 
wholesale prices W*, the optimal order quantity is Q*r. Under different policy, the optimal 
wholesale price is W*c, W
*
t, W
*
rc, and the optimal order quantity is Q
*
c, Q
*
t, Q
*
rc, respectively.
     Under the stochastic demand, the manufacturer’s profit is as Equation (1):
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Then we can get the retailer’s profit as Equation (2):
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Due to the manufacturer dominates, the retailer’s decision is the optimal order quantity 
Q*r according to the manufacturer’s wholesale price. According to Equation (2), we can get 
that 
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，so E(πr) is a strictly concave function. If we set 
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we can get the optimal order quantity Q*r as Equation (3):
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The tailer’s wholesale price varies according to the type of carbon policy, so under 
different carbon policies, the retailer’s order quantity varies, too.
4.2  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy
4.2.1  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy Without Carbon Policy
The information of the manufacturer and the retailer is symmetrical, as the dominant 
party, the manufacturer can predict the retailer’s ordering strategy to determine the optimal 
wholesale price, so the profit of the manufacturer is as Equation (4):
    πm (Q
*
r)=(W-Cs ) Q
*
r   . (4)
According to Equation (3) and (4), we can get the manufacturer’s expected profit as 
Equation (5):
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And the optimal wholesale price W* meet Equation (6):
   W*=Q*r(P-V+Cμ)f(F(Q
*
r))+Cs   . (6)
According to Equation (3) and (4), we can get the retailer’s optimal order quantity as 
Equation (7):
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4.2.2  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy Under Carbon Policy
Under different carbon policies, the manufacturer’s wholesale price strategies differ from 
each other. Now let us discuss manufacturer’s wholesale price strategy under each carbon 
policy respectively.
4.2.3  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy Under Policy 1- Mandatory 
Carbon Emissions Capacity
Under Policy 1- mandatory carbon emissions capacity, the profit of the manufacturer is as 
Equation (8):
    E(πm)c=(Wc-Cs)Q
*
c . (8)
According to Equations (3) and (8), the profit of the retailer is as Equation (9):
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According to Equation (9), we can get the following conclusion:
1) If <Q*c, Wc1>Wc2, the optimal wholesale price is Wc1=P+Cμ-F(Q0 )(P-V+Cμ ).
2) If  the optimal wholesale price meet the equation.
Proposition 1: Under mandatory carbon emissions capacity, when the manufacturer’s 
carbon emissions less than the carbon quota A, the policy has nothing to do with the optimal 
wholesale price and profit of the manufacturer. On the contrary, the manufacturer’s optimal 
wholesale price will be increased and the manufacturer’s profit will decrease. The retailers’ 
profit is a monotone increasing function of the order quantity, it will decrease with the 
decrease of order quantity.
Proof：
1) When the carbon emissions emit from the manufacturer’s optimal production less than 
the carbon quota A, Q0 ≥ Q
*
r, thenQ
*
c=Q
*
r , and the optimal wholesale is 
                        Wc2= Q
*
r (P-V+Cμ )f(F(Q
*
r))+Cs=W
*, E(πm)c=E(πm).
2) When the carbon emissions emit from the manufacturer’s optimal production more 
than the carbon quota A, Wc1=P+Cμ-F(Q0 )(P-V+Cμ). What is more, F(Q0) is a monotone 
increasing function of Q0, Q0<Q
*
r, so F(Q0)<F(Q
*
r), Wc1=P+Cμ-F(Q0)(P-V+Cμ)>P+Cμ-F(Q
*
r)
(P-V+Cμ). That is, the optimal wholesale price will increase.
Manufacture’s Optimal Pricing Policy and Retailer’s Optimal Ordering Policy 
Under Different Carbon Emission Policies
24
The unconditional maximum value must be greater than or equal to the maximum value 
under certain conditions, so when the carbon quota less than the carbon emissions produced 
by the optimal production, the manufacturer’s profit will decrease. From the Equation (2) 
we can know that π  
d
d
, so the retailer’s profit  E(πr)is a monotone increasing 
function of the order quantity Q. It will decrease with the decrease of order quantity.
4.2.4  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy Under Policy 2- Carbonemissions 
Tax Policy
Under carbon emissions tax policy, the manufacturer’s profit is as Equation (10):
    πm (Q
*
t)=(Wt-Cs-t) Q
*
t  . (10)
From Equation (3) and (10), we can get:                
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From Equation (11), we can know that the manufacturer can make out the optimal 
wholesale price W*t, and it meet the Equation (12):
   W*t=Q
*
t(P-V+Cμ)f(F(Q
*
t))+Cs+t.                                            (12)
According to Equation (11) and (12), the optimal order quantity can be concluded as 
Equation (13) :
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Proposition 2: Under carbon emissions tax policy, the wholesale price will increase, the 
order quantity will decrease, the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer will decrease.
Proof: Under carbon emissions tax policy, the existence of carbon tax is equivalent to the 
addition of the cost of production, so the retailer’s optimal order quantity will drop, which 
means Q*t < Q
*
r. According to Equation (12), the optimal wholesale price W
*
t is aninverse 
function of the order quantity, so W*t >W
*.Comparing the manufacturer’s profit under carbon 
emissions tax policy with that without carbon policy, we can find:
πm(Q
*
t )-E(πm)=(P-Cs+Cμ)(Q
*
t-Q
*
r )-tQ
*
t-(P-V+Cμ)[F(Q
*
t)Q
*
t-F(Q
*
r)Q
*
r],where(P-
Cs+Cμ)>0, Q
*
t<Q
*
r, F(Q
*
t)<F(Q
*
r).
Then it can be easily found that πm(Q*t )-E(πm)<0, which means the manufacturer’s profit 
will drop down under carbon emissions tax.
As proposition 1, the retailers’ profit is a monotone increasing function of the order 
quantity, so under carbon emissions tax policy, Q*t<Q
*
r, the retailer’s profit also drops.
4.2.5  Manufacturer’s Wholesale Price Strategy Under Policy 3- Cap-and-Trade
Under cap-and-trade policy, if the carbon quota  is equal or greater than Q*r, the policy will 
have nothing to do with the carbon emissions. So the necessary condition that the policy 
works is 
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The manufacturer’s profit can be expressed as Equation (14):
   πm(Qi)=(Wrc-Cs)Qi-i(Qi-Q0). (14)
According to Equation (3) and (14), it can be found that
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Then the optimal wholesale price Wrc
* can be concluded as Equation (15):
   Wrc
*=Q*i(P-V+Cμ )f(F(Q
*
i) )+Cs+i. (15)
From Equation (3) and (15), the optimal order quantity is as Equation (16):
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Proposition 3: Under cap-and-trade policy, the wholesale price will rise, the production 
and order quantity will decrease, and the retailer’s profit will decrease too.
Proof: Under cap-and-trade policy, the manufacturer will buy more carbon emissions 
permits from carbon emissions market. That is equivalent to the increase of each 
commodity’s  cost. So the optimal order quantity and the production will decrease.
According to Equation (15), the wholesale price is an inverse function of the order 
quantity, so the wholesale price will rise.
As proposition 1, retailer’s profit is a monotone increasing function of the order quantity, 
and Qi<Q
*
r, so under cap-and-trade policy, the retailer’s profit will decrease as well.
Proposition 4: Under cap-and-trade policy, the manufacturer’s profit is decided by 
the carbon quota A. Let 
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, if A>A0 , the 
manufacturer’s profit will increase, if A<A0 , the manufacturer’s profit will decrease, and the 
manufacturer’s profit will remain the same as that without carbon policy when A=A0.
Proof: According to Equation (4) and (14),
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πm(Q
*
r)=(W-Cs) Q
*
r. When πm(Qi)=πm(Q
*
r), � � ��W
∗ � �����∗ � ����� � �����
�  +eQi.
So if A>A0, πm(Qi)>πm(Q
*
r)，the manufacturer’s profit will increase，if A<A0πm 
(Qi)<πm(Q
*
r)，the manufacturer’s profit will decrease, and if A=A0,πm(Qi)=πm(Q
*
r)the 
manufacturer’s profit will remain the same as that without carbon policy.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we studied the manufacturer’s pricing strategy and retailer’s ordering strategy 
when considering mandatory carbon emissions capacity policy, carbon emissions tax policy 
and cap-and-trade policy respectively, based on the classic newsvendor mode, with the two-
stage supply chain of one manufacturer and one retailer (manufacturer dominates) as the 
object. Comparing with the situation without carbon emissions policy, it could be concluded 
as follows: (1) Under mandatory carbon emissions capacity policy, when the limit production 
(the production according to the carbon quota) is more than the optimal production, the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price, the retailer’s ordering quantity and their profits will not be 
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affected. The retailer’s ordering quantity depends on the wholesale price. On the contrary, 
when the limit production is less than the optimal production, the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price will be increased, the retailer’s ordering quantity will be decreased, and each member’s 
profit will decline. The manufacturer’s wholesale and profit depend on the carbon quota. (2)
Under carbon emissions tax policy, the manufacturer’s wholesale price will be increased, 
the retailer’s ordering quantity will be decreased, and their profits will decline, the retailer’s 
ordering quantity depends son the carbon emissions tax. (3) Under cap-and-trade policy, the 
retailer’s ordering quantity and profit will be decreased, and the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price will be increased. The manufacturer’s profit depends on the carbon quota and the 
carbon emission’s price. The retailer’s ordering quantity depends on the sale price of carbon 
emissions.
Under three different carbon emissions policies, the manufacturer’s pricing strategy 
and the retailer’s ordering strategy are different. From the perspective of supply chain, 
the research on the strategies of each node company of the supply chain under different 
carbon emissions policies built a micro-foundation for the design and formulation of 
carbon emissions policies. By studding the companies’ strategies, carbon policies’s 
scientificity and effectiveness was validated, and achieved “win-win”.  In the future, it will 
be of greate significance to study from the perspective of multiple retailers and multiple 
manufacturers.
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